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Abstract
What factors explain the success of the UK Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team?
To answer this question, this article applies insights from organizational theory, particu-
larly accounts of change agents. Change agents are able—with senior sponsorship—to
foster innovation by determination and skill: they win allies and circumvent more trad-
itional bureaucratic procedures. Although Behavioural Insights Team is a change
agent—maybe even a skunkworks unit—not all the facilitating factors identified in the
literature apply in this central government context. Key factors are its willingness to
work in a non-hierarchical way, skills at forming alliances, and the ability to form good
relationships with expert audiences. It has been able to promote a more entrepreneur-
ial approach to government by using randomized controlled trials as a robust method of
policy evaluation.
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Introduction
Journalists often pronounce the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) as a success.
1
This is a surprisingly positive press for the work of a small body of civil servants
and advisers, based in the Cabinet Oﬃce, who have very little money and no
powers to do its job. In fact, it might be thought that the use of psychological
research to encourage citizens to behave in better ways would attract the ire of the
populist press, resistant as it is to paternalist measures coming from the state. Not
only has the team won the support of the media, it has pioneered the application of
behavioural insights in government. As this article will show, it has helped intro-
duce a large number of initiatives and successfully promoted the use of randomized
controlled trials (RCTs).
This success has been achieved in an unpropitious context. At the top of the civil
service, it is usually hard to promote new ideas outside the main corridors of power
as past advisers to prime ministers have found to their cost. Consider those who
ran the ill-fated Central Policy Review Staﬀ (CPRS) (Blackstone and Plowden,
1990); or Bernard Donoughue, who had to ﬁght endless internal battles to set up
and operate the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit during the 1974–1979 Labour gov-
ernment (Donoughue, 2005); or the advisers to Tony Blair, who could not function
eﬀectively in such a fast-changing and fractious environment (Rawnsley, 2000,
2010). While prime ministers often desire to implement radical policy changes, in
practice such initiatives are usually short-lived, and political leaders get ground
down by the pace of government, the power of the insiders, the constant need for
good headlines, the endless internal battles and the power of producer groups—
what Tony Blair called the ‘scars on my back’.
2 Moreover, the bureaucracy at the
centre of government is often resistant to change and is ready to oppose new units
that might drive innovation (Kelman, 2005). In this context, the success of BIT is
intriguing and suggests there are some special factors at work, which could throw
some light on more general conditions for innovation in public sector organiza-
tions, especially those at the centre of government.
The aim of this paper is to examine the history and operation of the team to
uncover what factors have caused its success, applying insights from organizational
theory and studies of private sector management. It adapts the framework of
change agents to identify the likely factors at work (Kanter, 1983), ﬁnding that
not all of them need to be present. By focusing on necessary rather than suﬃcient
conditions, this account of the team’s work can help produce a more parsimonious
account of innovation adoption in central government.
The paper takes the following structure. The ﬁrst part gives a history of the team
and outlines its successes. The second section is a review of academic approaches to
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framework to the activities of the team. The ﬁnal part oﬀers some general conclu-
sions of what can be learnt from the application of the framework.
The behavioural insights team
The UK coalition government elected in 2010 set up the Behavioural Insights
Team, sometimes referred to as ‘the nudge unit’ or just BIT. The unit ‘draws on
insights from academic research in behavioural economics and psychology, to
apply them to public policy making’.
3 It aims to ﬁnd ways to encourage citizens
to adopt more pro-social behaviours and to make better choices. It was created in
June 2010 as a unit within the Cabinet Oﬃce. It comprised at ﬁrst seven oﬃcials;
now it has expanded to 13. It takes advice from experts, such as Richard Thaler,
and set up an academic advisory panel.
Early in its life, the team was inﬂuential in persuading the Driver and Vehicle
Licensing Agency (DVLA) to require those who are renewing their driving licence
to choose whether to agree that their organs may be donated in the event of their
death. The team has pioneered a number of other reforms, which have appeared in
papers, such as on energy use (Cabinet Oﬃce et al., 2011), which reports work with
the private sector to try out diﬀerent kinds of incentives for consumers to change
their behaviour. BIT worked with the Department for Business Innovation and
Skills (BIS) on a consumer empowerment strategy, Better Choices: Better Deals
(April 2011), and also with the Department of Energy and Climate Change
(DECC) on energy saving, aiding in the redesign of Energy Performance
Certiﬁcates (EPCs). The team has done research into energy insulation, ﬁnding
that when people were oﬀered loft clearance schemes at cost price, there was a
ﬁvefold increase in loft insulation. The main obstacle to people getting loft insu-
lation is not cost but the diﬃculty of sorting out their lofts. The unit produced a
paper on health, which reports the work on smoking cessation, and then a paper on
charitable giving, jointly written with the Oﬃce for Civil Society in the Cabinet
(Cabinet Oﬃce, 2010). The team has worked on measures to encourage people
back into employment working with Job Centres to improve advice. There is
also a stream of work on charitable giving, working with ﬁnancial institutions to
to encourage employees to donate portions of salary (Cabinet Oﬃce, 2013).
One of the key activities of the unit is its use of RCTs to test out interventions,
which has become more a feature of its work as the team has settled in and
developed its approach. To this end, the team published in 2012 Test, Learn,
Adapt: Developing Public Policy with Randomised Controlled Trials. Written with
academics, this is a guide about how to do experiments (Haynes et al., 2012) and
was launched at a conference in June 2012.
The team worked with Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC) in
February 2011 to pioneer diﬀerent wordings for the reminder of tax returns,
which used RCTs. HMRC has now carried out a set of trials on tax reminders
coordinated by Michael Hallsworth. BIT worked with the HM Courts & Tribunals
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message prompts, reducing the number of bailiﬀ interventions by 150,000. The
team has done work with DVLA to ﬁnd out whether a photo of the owner’s car
would encourage people who are behind with registration to update. Many of these
ﬁndings are summarized in Fraud, error and debt: behavioural insights team paper
(Cabinet Oﬃce, 2012). The team’s documents claim that the reforms of individual
decision-making has identiﬁed public savings, such as from court ﬁnes and tax
reminders, at least £300m over a ﬁve-year period. This is done by using the
eﬀect sizes measuring the impact of the intervention from the RCTs and then
extrapolating them to the volume of transactions in each activity, such as the
beneﬁts of early payment of taxation (Behavioural Insights Team, 2012).
The team operates collaboratively which largely reﬂects its small size and
the need for willing partners to carry out its interventions. The team works
beyond central government departments and deals directly with local authorities,
but it would also be fair to say the most of the team’s work is with central
government departments because they have day-to-day dealings with the Cabinet
Oﬃce and its ministers, and where central government has the power and legitim-
acy to act.
The team has been met with enthusiasm across Whitehall, partly as a result of
the brieﬁngs and events the team holds. At the same time, there is a considerable
amount of contact between team members and the rest of the world, such as aca-
demics making contact, resulting in stream of eminent visitors to 10 Downing
Street, and many by bureaucrats from other countries. BIT works with other gov-
ernments, such as Government of New South Wales, Australia, where a member is
seconded in 2012–2013. The team has a project with Freebridge Housing
Association, which is seeking to use behavioural insights for the redevelopment
of a housing estate in King’s Lynn. Another feature of the team’s work is the
positive press it has received, which got much better during the life of the team.
This was not the case at ﬁrst, such as when it was branded as Cameron’s vanity
project, and Brendon O’Neill called for the illiberal nudge industry to ‘push oﬀ’.
4
But by 2011 it had got praise in newspapers right across the political spectrum.
5
Of course, no unit in the febrile environment of central government is going to
operate without controversy and has to work in the context of competition between
departments and ministers, where they are alternative sources of advice and con-
siderable pressures to claim credit. So the work on texting with mobile phones was
done with the courts service, but the Ministry of Justice and its research team were
less involved. Parts of HMRC are very supportive of the trials that can be done,
but other parts of this vast bureaucracy are much less interested in this agenda. The
unit did not manage (at ﬁrst) to persuade DVLA to the presentation of the option
of organ donations by a randomized trial in spite of trying. Not all the experiments
worked or produced the expected results, such as the trial of signature placement
with a local authority that did not conﬁrm Dan Arieley’s argument that signatures
at the top of documents increased compliance. The unit even got some bad press
for its job centre experiments.
6
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ernment, the conclusion to draw is that there is an increasing amount of activity at
the centre to encourage smarter behaviour change policies, much of it encouraged
by the work of the team. BIT is developing its approach and has become more
experienced at promoting behaviour change, especially from its use of robust evi-
dence from RCTs. The unit was set up with sunset clause that provided for its
closure in 2012. Showing its importance for government, the team has successfully
completed its sunset review. It now continues into the future with a broader remit
and has the ability to work overseas with other partners. In December 2012 the
team held an event to announce that is was going to operate as a mutual body at
arms length from government. Such an extension is a mark of the team’s success
and of the continuing interest of the government in research and policies on behav-
iour change. The government will hold a half share in the scheme and still continue
to commission work, but BIT can expand its activities. The unit claims this is
because of extensive demand for its services that is not able to meet all these in
its current organisational form.
Interestingly, the unit has fared much better than models in other countries.
President Obama appointed Cass Sunstein, one of the authors of Nudge (Thaler
and Sunstein 2008), to head up the Oﬃce of Information and Regulatory Aﬀairs,
but he has since stood down. In France, Centre for Strategic Analysis of the Prime
Minister employed a behaviour science expert, Olivier Oullier, as an adviser. But
under President Hollande this no longer happens. In fact, what happened in 2013 is
the transfer of the BIT model to other jurisdictions, such a new unit in the White
House.
7 So there must be a secret ingredient to BIT’s success.
Innovation
Work in organizational theory examines the conditions that can help organizations
become more innovative. In the private sector, such innovation is associated with
new products and higher proﬁtability (Argyris, 1993; Nooteboom, 2000), but in the
public sector is often about policy changes and better approaches to public sector
management (Kelman, 2005; NAO, 2009). Writers in this literature outline the
forces for conservatism within organizations, which are due to the power of rou-
tines, psychological factors and standard operating procedures, which tend to
beneﬁt those in power. Existing power holders may resist new policies because
they may be associated with younger post holders whose careers might beneﬁt.
To this can be arrayed forces for innovation that can overcome such resistance,
whose advocates are often concentrated in small groups in the organization’s bur-
eaucracy. But these reform groups need nurturing and must build a successful
coalition to overcome change. In addition, there is long-held assumption that
innovation is hard to achieve in the public sector because of the lack of the
proﬁt motive. Moreover, lines of accountability to political oﬃce holders mean
that bureaucrats have limited discretion to innovate independently. Nonetheless, in
the right conditions innovation can occur (Borins, 2002), and it is possible to read
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assessing what factors drive innovation.
Moss Kanter in The Change Master (1983) identiﬁes special conditions
whereby what are called change agents can become more prominent in an organ-
ization. Change agents or masters can pioneer innovations, which can then dif-
fuse within the organization. Kanter calls innovations new streams that need to
be managed. Key is the ability of the leaders of the organization to allow
enough delegation so these units can operate: ‘The degree to which the opportunity
to use power eﬀectively is granted to or withheld from individuals is one
operative diﬀerence between those companies which stagnate and those which
innovate’ (89).
These units have several names, but the one that has become celebrated in the
literature is skunkworks. The term was reported by Rogers in the Diﬀusion of
Innovations (Rogers, 1995: 139–140) to describe a section in an organization
charged with coming up with an innovation, and also popularized by Peters and
Waterman (Peters, 1982) in their famous management book, In Search of
Excellence as well as appearing in the academic literature on organizational innov-
ation (Bommer et al., 2009; Fosfuri and Thomas, 2009). The derivation, Skonk
Works, featured in the Al Capp comic strip Li’l Abner, which was popular in the
1940s. Skonk Works—later Skunk Works—become the nickname for the
Advanced Development Projects Division in Burbank, California, which designed
Lockkeed’s P-80 Shooting Star during the Second World War (Jenkins, 2001).
8
The unit was housed out in a windowless block next to a plastics factory, where its
workers were given a large amount of autonomy by the senior management who
just expected them to just get on with the job and to come up with the innovation.
Over time the Skunk Works Unit was charged with other product innovations.
Then other technology companies copied the idea. For example, Steve Jobs of
Apple created a Texaco Towers team in this way. Such units are often celebrated
in the media. For example, in the ﬁlm The Dam Busters civil servants allowed the
eccentric inventor Barnes Wallis to form a group of inventors and aviators to
design and test the bouncing bomb.
In these accounts, it is possible to identify several conditions for the eﬀective
success of such innovations, which can either be a feature of the organization or
come from the management style that a chief executive introduces. The units are
managed with:
1. less hierarchy;
2. operate within a diﬀerent framework of performance evaluation, where the unit
is not subject to short-term management objectives;
3. are nurtured by senior manager champions who can protect them from turf
wars;
4. are funded diﬀerently and have a separate structure of cost control;
5. occupy a separate physical space;
9
6. are subject to a longer time cycle for the measurement of success;
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organization. This protects the inspirational forms of leadership that are hard to
replace. A small group is important.
Kanter (1989) talks about the need to manage the tensions between the main-
streams and new streams, each of which require diﬀerent sorts of management.
The key diﬃculty is the transfer of the new stream back to the mainstream, what
can be called mainstreaming, whereby the innovative practice becomes part of the
normal running of the organisation; but in practice this is very hard to achieve
because of the tendency of old practices and routines to reassert themselves, and for
innovations to get watered down, which often involves re-labeling old practices as
new ones.
There is another aspect of Kanter’s framework that deserves particular atten-
tion: the interaction between these conditions and the personal characteristics of
the managers who are charged with sponsoring or carrying out innovations. Kanter
pays great attention to this in her later works which are more about how individ-
uals might learn various techniques to become change agents (Kanter, 1999), but
what is important is whether the structures she discusses interact with innovators
and risk-takers. Put simply, if the right people are placed in the appropriate struc-
tures then innovation can take place.
There are a number of diﬃculties with this kind of work in that it relies on
selecting successful companies and then making an inference from the incidence of
these factors, a classic example of selection bias. The reader is not informed
whether failing companies also adapted the same measures. The skunkworks exam-
ples are also very selective, and it very hard to work out what is rhetorical from
what is true: these are the stories that companies like to tell. It is very hard to make
a causal inference as there are so many factors at work, and it is not clear from
reading these academic papers which element is predominant. One advantage of a
case study is that it can examine what is the relative incidence of various factors.
With BIT there is a clear history of innovation, so it is possible in one case to see
what conditions apply and what do not. Of course, it is not possible to conﬁrm or
falsify elements of the framework, but it is possible to use it to gain further under-
standing of what causes innovation.
Explaining the success of BIT
In this section, theory and practice come together in a review of the experience of
BIT, as illuminated by the factors listed above. The ﬁrst is whether there is less
hierarchy with the team. Here there are elements of the team that ﬁt into the
conventional hierarchy of the civil service, as the fact that most of the staﬀers
were seconded from other units, such as the deputy director of the team, Owain
Service. It operates under the management procedures of the Cabinet Oﬃce, being
subject to the direction of a steering committee, chaired by the Cabinet Secretary.
Normal rules apply for appointments and its general operation. There is nothing
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the Oﬃce for Civil Society. But it is clear that the unit has a relatively free hand to
deﬁne its work and the steering was light touch. David Halpern, who had previ-
ously worked for Labour in the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit, likes to work
across institutional structures, prefers to deal closely with the politicians, and is
adept at summarizing research ﬁndings in an attractive and common sense way that
is very appealing to a practitioner audience.
Though there is a director and deputy director, and line management operates,
the team is largely ﬂat in hierarchy and its members like work closely together. The
layout of the Cabinet Oﬃce encourages this with its long lines of shared desks.
Halpern works between the Cabinet Oﬃce and a base in Number 10. The team
employs outsiders, such as Laura Haynes, who has an academic background, and
engaged a series of short-term research fellows, who are often current PhD stu-
dents, helped with support from the Economic and Social Research Council. The
team works with whoever is willing to do projects with it, usually in a collaborative
rather than hierarchical manner. To design and analyze the trials, it sometimes
draws on the expertise of academics on its advisory panel. The mutual organization
may support the non-hierarchical approach of the team as it can work outside the
normal procedures governing the civil service.
The second factor is linked to the ﬁrst, which is a diﬀerent framework of per-
formance evaluation. There was no strict framework in place: BIT was not set
targets and was left to formulate its own initiatives subject to the approval of
the steering board. The politicians were even prepared to let the unit fail, a view
which shocked the press.
10
The third factor of the role of senior champions is particularly important in
central government. Here the role of the Prime Minster is pertinent, given his
interest in behaviour change and wish to foster the project, The Big Society. As
important were other champions: one was the Prime Minister’s former director of
strategy, Steve Hilton, who is interested in behaviour change and innovation in
central government; the other is the former Cabinet Secretary, Gus O’Donnell, who
was an academic economist, is enthused by the behavioural economics agenda and
takes a personal interest in the work of the team. These are powerful people who
are able to open doors and oﬀer protection. What is interesting from the change
agent perspective is that both left government in 2012, but without aﬀecting the
team’s work. Steve Hilton left in May 2012 and O’Donnell retired in December
2012. But the unit continued eﬀectively in 2013. It enjoys good political support
from Cabinet Oﬃce ministers, Francis Maude and Oliver Letwin.
The fourth factor—being funded diﬀerently—does not apply to the team’s work
as it works within the civil service. There is no diﬀerent system of cost control. The
move to more private working may increase ﬁnancial ﬂexibility. Fifth, there is no
separate space for the team as it occupies space amid the anonymous ranks of desks
at One Whitehall with just a small poster to indicate its presence. There is no
special building redolent of the Skunk Works Unit. Given the political environ-
ment it is important for the unit to be plugged into the decision-making machinery
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have worked in these circumstances. Even though the unit has freedom, it probably
works to shorter timescales than innovation management in the private sector,
partly for political reasons even though policy has been more stable under the
Coalition with the ﬁve-year ﬁxed-term parliament and the Coalition Agreement,
which has encouraged policy-makers to focus on implementation and improving
policy.
Sixth, the time cycle is not relevant either since there was a two-year sunset
clause on the unit’s work. The team had a slow start, and experienced some changes
in members, such as the departure of Paul Dolan in 2011. In the second year of the
team’s work it made its key successes and carried out the RCTs that are the basis of
its current reputation.
Seventh, low staﬀ turnover has been a feature of the team’s work and the team
has remained stable since 2011 with the same members in place, which is one of the
conditions for such units. This is in contrast to much of the Cabinet Oﬃce and
other parts of government, which have experienced high staﬀ turnover in recent
years. The reasons for this are probably because members of the team like to work
together, and there is a strong espirit de corps in the unit, which is in turn sustained
by its relative longevity.
Discussion and conclusion
BIT has all the hallmarks of a change agent: it works in an alternative stream
from other units of government, it promotes new ideas and ways of working,
and it has been successful in promoting innovation. The literature on organiza-
tional change provides a good description of how the unit was set up and operated,
how senior sponsorship allowed it to do new things and operate in part against the
grain. One assumes that the politicians and civil servants knew what they were
doing when they hired Halpern to direct the unit as he had performed a similar role
with the Labour government. The Cabinet Secretary must have expected that the
unit would attempt to drive innovation, and this ﬁtted with his outlook as an
unconventional civil servant. In terms of the conditions for a successful change
agent, many of them are in place, such as working with less hierarchy, the relative
freedom from conventional procedures, and the existence of a stable and small
group of employees. More interesting are the factors that do not appear to be so
important, such as not having a separate building, and the constraints on the time
cycle. Also, with the departure of O’Donnell and Hilton, the need for senior pro-
tection seems less important than the literature suggests, though of course the
senior protector supreme in the form of the Prime Minister is still in place. It
may be the case that the lack of success of other Coalition government policies
is partly responsible for this protection. Halpern and his unit are able to deliver to
the Prime Minister successes in an otherwise bleak environment for the govern-
ment. The costs of operating the unit are low, and there are few risks, especially
since journalists like it too. One can imagine why the politicians are happy to
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central lead.
So the conditions identiﬁed by the change agent literature seem only partially
applicable in this case, which is not surprising given the special and highly political
content of UK central government. But there is enough that is recognizable from
the change agent framework to suggest that it is something analogous at work here,
in particular the idea of giving a small team the autonomy and protection to
designs and promote innovations. The team model needs careful preparation and
in particular requires the right balance of skills and people to do the job eﬀectively.
The team has to make friends and build support. But it shows what can be done
with a modest level of investment by the centre. Whether such units are time limited
is beyond the scope of this article, and it is clear that bureaucratic routines and
demands of governing take priority in the long term. But when there is the right
balance of environment, structure and people it is possible to produce more innov-
ation at the centre of British government.
Notes
1. For example, Chris Bell, ‘Inside the Coalition’s controversial “Nudge Unit”’, The
Telegraph, 11 February 2013.
2. 6 July 1999 when talking about public sector reform during a speech to venture
capitalists.
3. https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/behavioural-insights-team
4. Spiked 1 November 2010. http://www.spiked-online.com/site/article/9840/
5. Alison Benjamin, ‘David Halpern: “We try to avoid legislation and ordering”’, The
Guardian, Tuesday 5 February 2013.
6. The Guardian, 6 May 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/may/06/
jobseekers-psychometric-test-failure
7. Time, 9 August 2013, http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/09/nudge-back-in-fashion-
at-white-house/
8. In the cartoon, the Skonk Works was a run-down factory on the remote outskirts of
Dogpatch, run by a character called Big Barnsmell. The local residents of Dogpatch died
from the emissions from skonk oil that Barnswell and his cousin produced by grinding
dead skunks and old shoes in a bubbling cauldron. These comic strips were popular in
the 1940s so when a Lockheed designer in the unit answered the telephone saying ‘Skonk
Works’, the term stuck. The company had to change the name to Skunk Works to avoid
breach of copyright.
9. This is a specific skunkworks condition.
10. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/feb/20/nudge-unit-oliver-letwin
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